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DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT AND THE
PRESERVATION OF OPEN SPACE*
JOHN C. KEENE**
The loss of prime agricultural, forest and open space lands is one of
the central problems currently facing the United States. While esti-
mates vary considerably,' it is certain that hundreds of thousands, and
possibly millions, of acres of open land are being converted to other
uses every year. Both Congress2 and the states3 are grappling with a
* This Article is an adaptation and up-dating of REGIONAL SCIENCE RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE: AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENTIAL
ASSESSMENT OF FARMS AND OPEN SPACE (1976), a detailed evaluation of the effectiveness
of differential assessment laws for conferring tax benefits and preserving open space.
UNTAXING OPEN SPACE also contains case studies of the operation of these laws in
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
and Washington and an extensive bibliography. I wish to acknowledge the thoughtful
contributions of David Berry, Robert E. Coughlin, James Farnam, Eric Kelly, Thomas
Plaut and Ann Louise Strong who shared in the research for and %iriting of that study.
** Associate Professor of City and Regional Planning, University of Pennsylvania.
B.A., Yale University, 1953; J.D., Harvard University, 1959; M.C.P., University of
Pennsylvania, 1966.
1. See U.S. DEP'TOF AGRICULTURE, Trends in Land Use and Competition for Land to
Produce Food and Fiber, in PERSPECTIVES ON PRIME LANDS 1-36 (1975).
2. In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress amended the estate tax provisions so that
under carefully defined conditions, farm real estate inherited by a member of a dece-
dent's family may be valued at farm use value instead of fair market value, and provided
for a recapture of some or all of the foregone tax revenue if the property is sold to non-
family members or converted to another use within 15 years of death. Tax Reform Act of
1976 § 2003, I.R.C. § 2032A. The tax-writing committees intended to reduce the pres-
sures for sale or conversion resulting from heavy estate tax obligations. H.R. REP. No.
1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356,
3359. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, TAx MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 299, VALUA-
TION OF REAL ESTATE A-13 to A-20 (1977).
3. The New Jersey legislature has authorized an experimental $5 million Agricultural
Preserve Demonstration program for the acquisition of development rights to farmland
in Burlington County, which is now in its early stages of implementation. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 4: I B (West Supp. 1977). Several municipalities are experimenting with transfer-
able development rights, although few rights have actually been transferred. In essence,
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wide variety of proposals which seek in one way or another to retain
open land. Most states have promulgated or are in the process of
promulgating land use policies which necessarily address the problem
of retention of agricultural land.4 We are in a time of innovation and
experimentation in which federal, state and local governments are
testing new ideas and reworking old ones in a complex and probing
attempt to find ways of preserving agricultural and other open lands
within the constitutional, economic and political parameters of the
rural land market.
While governments at all levels have been considering novel ap-
proaches to preserving open space, state legislatures have participated
in a little noticed but remarkable movement that has led to the wide-
spread enactment of so-called differential assessment laws. These
statutes authorize the assessment of eligible land at its current use
value instead of its fair market value, thus reducing the real property
taxes that are levied on the land. They have been enacted under the
banners of preserving open space and easing the tax burdens on farm-
ers, and rest on the fundamental principle that, by reducing property
the concept involves the severance of development rights from a piece of privately-
owned property combined with a guarantee to the owner that the rights can vest in the
future on a similarly situated piece of property. For a further explanation of the concept,
see J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT (1974); Foster, Schnidman & Bailey, Transferable
Development Rights: Are They a Step in the Direction of Better Land Use Management:
34 URBAN LAND 28 (1975); Schnidman, Transferable Development Rights: An Idea in
Search of Implementation, 11 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 339 (1976). See also Keene,
Transferable Development Rights, in TOUGH CHOICES IN TODAY'S WORLD 250-59 (1977);
Woodbury, Transfer of Development Rights: A New Tool for Planners, 41 J. AM. INST.
PLANNERS 3 (1975).
Many counties in California have enacted sophisticated agricultural zoning programs.
See, e.g., King County's Agricultural Protection Program, King County, Cal., Ordinance
3064 (Feb. 4, 1977). New York passed an Agricultural District Law in 1971, permitting
county governments to authorize differential assessment of agricultural tracts of 500
acres or more. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 300-307 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1976).
The law also prevents local governments from restricting farming practices beyond the
requirements of health and safety, requires public agencies seeking to condemn land in
the districts to show that acceptable substitute sites are not available, and limits the
power of public utility districts to assess charges against farmland for services not
needed by farmers. Id. Over a million acres, or about 10% of the state's agricultural land
has been put in such districts. See METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERN-
MENTS, FARMLAND RETENTION IN THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 39 (1976).
4. See Collins, Agricultural Land Preservation in a Land Use Perspective, 31 J. SOIL
AND WATER CONSERVATION 182 (1976). For instance, it has been proposed that Pennsyl-
vania create agricultural districts similar to those in New York, change the state inher-
itance tax law so that farms are valued at agricultural use value, and adopt new incentive
programs to encourage farmers to continue farming land. GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF STATE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, A LAND POLICY PROGRAM FOR PENNSYLVANIA: AN IN-
TERIM POLICY REPORT (1976). For a list of states that have promulgated similar land use
policies, see LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 253-56 (E. Moss ed. 1977).
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taxes, the rate at which farmland is being converted to non-farm uses
can be significantly decreased.
Since 1956, when Maryland enacted the first differential assessment
statute, forty-four state legislatures have passed laws which grant
preferential treatment to farm or other types of undeveloped land. 5 Of
5. Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.035 (Michie 1976); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 42-
136, -227 (West Supp. 1977); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-479 to -480 (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1975); California: CAL. CONST. art XIII, § 8; CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-
51205, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 421-429 (Deering Supp. 1977); Colorado: COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 137-1-3(5) to -3(6) (Michie 1973); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-131a to
-131n, 12-107a to -107f, -504a to -507h (1977); Delaware: DEL. CONST. art. 8-, § I
(Because of technical errors in the passage of this amendment, it may be defective);
Florida: FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 193.461 (Preferential Assessment
for Agricultural Land), .501 (Recreation Land Restrictive Agreement) (West Supp.
1977); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 246-12, -12.3 to .4 (Dedication Program), -10
(Deferral Program) (Supp. 1975); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ch. 2 § 63-202 (Supp. 1976); Illinois:
ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 4(b); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 501(a)(1)-501(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1977); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-4-13 (Bums Supp. 1977); Iowa: IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 384.1, 444.21, 441.22 (West Supp. 1976); Kentucky: Ky. CONST. § 172A; KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 132.010, .190-.200 (Baldwin 1976); Louisiana: LA. CONST. art. VII,
§ 18(c); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47.2301-.2309 (West Supp. 1977); Maine: ME. CONST.
art. IX, § 8; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 1101-1118 (West Supp. 1977); Maryland: MD.
CONST. art. 15, art. 43; MD. ANN CODE art. 81, § 19(b) (Michie Supp. 1976); Mas-
sachusetts: MASS. CONST. art. XCIX; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 61A, §§ 1-24 (Michie/Law.
Co-op. 1977); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.701-.719 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§
26.1287(l)-.1287(19) (Callaghan Supp. 1976)); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 273.111
(Preferential Assessment for Agricultural Lands), .112 (Golf Course and Ski Area
Program) (West Supp. 1976); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 137.017-.026 (Vernon Supp.
1976) Montana: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 84-401, -429.12, -437.1 to. 17 (Smith 1974 &
Supp. 1976); Nebraska: NEB. CONST. art. 8, § 1; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-1343 to -1346
(Supp. 1974); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 361.325, 361A.010-.160 (Assessment of
Agricultural Property), .170-.250 (Assessment of Open-Space Property) (1975); New
Hampshire: N.H. CONST. art. 5-B; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 79A:1-:14 (Curative
Taxation), :15-:21 (Discretionary Easements) (Supp. 1975); New Jersey: N.J. CONST. art.
8, § 1(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:4-23.1 to .23 (West Supp. 1977); New Mexico: N.M.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-29-9 (Smith Supp. 1975); New York: N.Y.
AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 300-307 (Land in Agricultural Districts) (McKinney Supp.
1976); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-277.2 to .7 (Michie Supp. 1975); North
Dakota: N.D. CENr. CODE § 57-02-27 (Smith Supp. 1973); Ohio: OHIO CONST. art. II, §
36; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5713.30-.39 (Page Supp. 1976); Oklahoma: OKLA. CONST.
art. X, § 8; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2427 (West Supp. 1976); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 308.345-.403, 215.203-.263 (1975); Pennsylvania: PA. CONST. art. 8, § 2; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11941-11947; tit. 72, §§ 5490.1-.13 (Purdon Supp. 1977); Rhode Island:
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 44-27-1 to -6, -5 to 12, -39 to -41 (1970); South Carolina: S.C. CODE §§
65-1605.1 to .2 (Michie Supp. 1975) as amended by Act 750, 1976 S.C. Acts; South
Dakota: S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 15; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 10-6-31 to-36 (Smith
Supp. 1976); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-650 to -658 (Bobbs-Merrill 1976);
Texas: TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § -d; Utah: UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 3; UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 59-5-87 to -105 (Smith Supp. 1977); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2741 (Devel-
opment Rights Program) (Equity Supp. 1977); Virginia: VA. CONST. art. X, § 2; VA. CODE
§§ 58-769.4 to .15:1 (Michie Supp. 1977); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
84.34.010 (Bancroft-Whitney/West Supp. 1976); Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. §§ 39-82 (Michie
Supp. 1976).
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the remaining states, Alabama and West Virginia have so-called clas-
sification laws which allow modest preferential treatment of agricultur-
al land.6 Kansas and Wisconsin have amended their constitutions and
are currently considering differential assessment legislation. 7
Differential assessment laws are usually categorized as falling into
one of three categories: preferential assessment, deferred taxation,
and restrictive agreement.8 Preferential assessment laws produce an
abatement of taxes by authorizing assessors simply to assess eligible
land on the basis of farm use value, rather than on market value.
Deferred taxation laws add an additional feature and impose a sanction
requiring owners of eligible land who convert it to non-eligible uses to
pay some or all the taxes which they were excused from paying for a
number of years prior to conversion. Restrictive agreement laws in-
clude both preferential assessment and, in all states except Vermont, a
sanction in the form of a payment of back taxes. In addition, they
require the owner to sign a contract spelling out his rights and duties,
and preventing him from converting the land to an ineligible use for a
specified term of years. In California, for instance, the owner must
wait until the end of a ten year run-out period, after signifying his
intention of nonrenewal, before he can convert the land to non-eligible
uses as of right.9
The logic behind differential assessment laws is simple. All across
the country, rural land values and tax rates have been rising as urbani-
zation moves out from the city to undeveloped areas.' 0 As this occurs,
land acquires an increased value over and above its farm use value
because it can be used for residential, commercial, and industrial
purposes or has a potential for such development. Tax rates rise
because the new residents of the rural-urban fringe demand schools,
water and sewer systems, roads, police protection, and other public
services which were previously unnecessary. Caught in the double
crunch of paying taxes at higher rates on land whose market value was
rising, farmers and other owners of undeveloped land sought to have
6. ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 17 (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE § 11-8-5 (1974).
7. KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 12; Wis. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
8. See, e.g., ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, STATE
PROGRAMS FOR DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT OF FARM AND OPEN SPACE LAND (1974);
REGIONAL SCIENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE: AN EVALUATION OF
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT OF FARMS AND OPEN SPACE (1976)
(prepared for the Council on Environmental Quality) [hereinafter cited as UNTAXING
OPEN SPACE].
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51244-51246 (Deering 1974 & Supp. 1977).
10. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REVISED ESTIMATES
OF TAXES LEVIED ON FARM REAL PROPERTY, 1960-73, BULL. No. 538 (1975).
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their land assessed for real property tax purposes at its current or farm
use value rather than at its fair market value, which often reflects a
substantial developmental value.
In order to set the stage for the analysis which follows, it is neces-
sary to review the basic contextual framework in which differential
assessment operates. Farmers are producers of two entirely different
classes of goods for two different markets: agricultural commodities
and development sites. The common factor joining these two markets
is the farmer's land. When used for the production of agricultural
commodities, land has a value which is related to its capitalized
economic rent as a factor of production. Its economic rent is deter-
mined by such factors as soil quality, topography, distance from the
market, access to transportation facilities, level of management includ-
ing drainage, crop rotation and soil conservation practices, general
conditions in local, regional, national and international commodity
markets, natural conditions such as drought, and so on. The rate at
which economic rent is capitalized is a function of property taxes,
capitalization rates of competing investment, and investors' expecta-
tions concerning appreciation in land values."
When land is used for residential, commercial or industrial facilities,
its value is determined by its proximity to urban development, trans-
portation facilities, areas of special scenic or recreational interest, by
conditions in the mortgage markets, by population growth and migra-
tion, and, generally, by the demand for new facilities of all types.' 2
In many farming areas, especially those on the rural-urban fringe,
there are large differentials between the value of land as an input to the
production of agricultural commodities and its value as an input to
development. These differentials have produced the crisis which has
led to the adoption of differential assessment laws. These laws consti-
tute explicit departures from the uniformity principle found in most
state constitutions.1 3
All differential assessment laws are examples of what has come to
be known as "tax expenditure," by means of which the tax bills of
11. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 8, at 5-6.
12. Id.
13. Most states have constitutional provisions which mandate uniform taxation. See,
e.g., OKLA. CONsT. art. X, § 8; Wis. CONST. art. 8, § 1. However, many states have cir-
cumvented uniformity of taxation clauses by amending their constitutions to permit
preferential treatment of eligible land. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. 8, §
I; FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 4(b); Ky. CONST. § 172A; LA. CONST. art.
7, § 18(C); ME. CONST. art. IX, § 8; MD. CONST. art. 15, art. 43; MASS. CONST. art.
XCIX; NEB. CONST. art. 8, § 1; N.H. CONsT. art. 5-B; N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 1(1); N.M.
CONsT. art. VIII, § 1; OHIo CONST. art. II, § 36: PA. CONST. art. 8, § 2; S.D. CONST. art.
1977]
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some taxpayers are reduced as a result of special tax treatment.14 Tax
expenditures take a variety of forms such as exclusions from the tax
base, exemptions, deductions, tax credits, preferential tax rates, and
tax deferral. 15 While there are borderline cases in which opinions may
differ as to whether a particular item is part of the normal structure or a
tax expenditure, there is little question that differential assessment is a
classic example of the latter. The effect of a tax expenditure is precise-
ly the same as if the taxpayer who receives the benefit were to pay
taxes at the same rate as other, non-preferred taxpayers, and then were
to receive a simultaneous grant from the government in the amount of
the tax benefit. Thus, there are two ways in which a government can
make financial assistance available to a particular class of taxpayers.
The first is to tax all taxpayers on the same tax base at the same rate
and then make grants in the desired amounts to preferred classes. The
second is to structure the tax expenditure system so as to reduce the
tax bills of the preferred classes by the same amount. In the first
instance, the governmental budget would be increased by the amount
of the direct grants to beneficiaries, and the appropriations would be
made for this purpose each year. In the second, the payments to them
would be made through the tax expenditure structure, where they
largely escape annual legislative review. Where tax expenditures exist,
they have the effect of shifting the tax burden away from the preferred
class to all other taxpayers in an amount equal to the benefits con-
ferred on the preferred class.
I. A SURVEY OF DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT LEGISLATION
A. Objectives of Differential Assessment Legislation
As is true of any piece of complex legislation, differential assess-
VIII, § 15; TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-d; UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 3; VA. CONST. art. X,
§ 2.
However, in some states which did not make such amendments, differential assess-
ment laws have been held to violate the uniformity clause of the state constitution. See,
e.g., State Tax Comm'n v. Gales, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960). Others, meanwhile,
have been upheld against the same allegation. See, e.g., Bensalem Township School
Dist. v. County Comm'rs, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 411, 303 A.2d 258 (1973).
14. See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973). Any tax system can be viewed
as consisting of two parts. The first establishes the normal structure of the tax by
defining the tax base, whether it be taxable income, property or some transaction such as
sale, and establishing the rate of, and procedures for collecting, the tax. The second
consists of a set of tax benefits which are conferred by the government by means of tax
reductions for certain classes of taxpayers, with the objectives of providing incentives
for certain kinds of socially desirable.activities, easing hardships, or simply favoring
politically powerful interest groups. The second part is not necessary to the proper
working of the tax structure. Id.
15. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FIS-
CAL YEAR 1978, SPECIAL ANALYSIS F, TAX EXPENDrrURES 119-27 (1977).
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ment laws have been enacted to achieve more than one objective. In
the analysis in later sections, this Article will examine the effective-
ness of such statutes with respect to what appear to be the predomin-
ant legislative aims: to provide tax relief for farmers and to preserve
open space. 16 It is useful here, however, to review some of the specific
public policies which different differential assessment laws have
sought to advance.
In some states, the objective appears to be to help the family farm-
er.17 In other states, the objective has been to give a tax benefit to all
farmland, regardless of ownership, quality of soil or proximity to
urban development. 18 Some statutes seek to protect other kinds of
open land. California's Williamson Act makes differential assessment
available to qualifying land devoted to agricultural, recreational, scen-
ic, wildlife habitat and open space uses. 19 Still other states have estab-
lished planning and zoning requirements which are designed to limit
participation to those tracts of land which are in areas designated for
agricultural use in a municipal comprehensive plan.20
These examples serve to illustrate the variety of objectives which
differential taxation laws have sought to achieve. Each state's statute
must of course be evaluated in terms of its own set of goals.
B. Characteristics of Differential Assessment Legislation
1. General
Table 121 summarizes the provisions of state laws granting differ-
16. See notes 61 to 110 and accompanying text infra. See also R. Ba'ows, Lower
Taxes for Farmland and Open Space?, in Staff Paper No. 84, 17-18 (Univ. of Wis.
Cooperative Extension Program 1974).
17. Texas, for instance, requires that the owner must be a natural person, not a
corporation, that he be in agriculture for profit and that agriculture be his primary
occupation and income source. TEX. CONST. art. 8, § 1-d(a). In addition, the land must
have been in agricultural use exclusively and continuously for the three preceding years.
Id. § l-d(e). For a discussion of when agriculture is considered a primary occupation, see
Gragg v. Cayuga Independent School Dist., 525 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975);
Driscoll Foundation v. Nueces County, 445 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
18. In Indiana, the legislature simply directed assessors to assess land in agricultural
use as agricultural land and set no further eligibility criteria. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-4-13
(1972). This definition has been expanded somewhat by the State Board of Tax Commis-
sioners so that agricultural land is defined as "an area in open country used for
producing crops and raising livestock, and whose principal value arises out of such use."
All land classified by the assessor is automatically awarded preferential assessment.
STATE BD. OF TAX COMM'RS., INDIANA REAL PROPERTY APPRAISAL MANUAL at F I (1968).
19. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51201, 51231, 51238 (Deering 1974).
20. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 215.203, 215.213 (1975).
21. Table I is the chart on the following pages.
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ential assessment to agricultural and open lands which had been enact-
ed as of June, 1977. This data was assembled from two excellent earlier
studies,2 information supplied by tax officials in the fifty states and
staff research.
The state programs identified in Table 1 are listed alphabetically
under the classifications: pure preferential assessment, deferred taxa-
tion or restrictive agreement. Some states have more than one pro-
gram, and these are listed separately. The table is accompanied by
explanatory notes.
For the purposes of classification, a strict definition of restrictive
agreement is used in this Article. The programs in Hawaii, 23 Louisia-
na,24 New York,25 Pennsylvania 6 and Washington27 are classified as
deferred taxation programs even though they require the landowner to
commit his land to the eligible use for a specified number of years. This
is done because the agreements are not enforced. As long as the
landowner in these states pays the rollback tax28 and any other penal-
ties, he may change the use of his land without petitioning for release
from the agreement.
Table 1 specifically excludes three widespread forms of legislation
which have the effect of reducing the tax burden on specified open
lands: state open space easement enabling statutes, forest taxation
laws and classified property tax systems.
Many states have enacted open space easement laws which au-
thorize municipalities to acquire interests in open land for the purposes
of preserving open space.29 Once an owner has conveyed such an
22. R. GLOUDEMANS, USE VALUE FARMLAND ASSESSMENTS 1 (1974) (emphasizes the
evaluation of the operation and impact of differential assessment laws on tax base and
land use); ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, STATE PRO-
GRAMS FOR DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT OF FARM AND OPEN SPACE LAND (1974) (contains
a detailed state by state review of provisions).
23. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 246-10 to -63 (Supp. 1975).
24. Act No. 702, 1976 La. Acts.
25. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 300 to 307 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11941-11947; tit. 72, §§ 5490.1-. 13 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
27. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 84.34.010-.34.921 (Bancroft-Whitney West Supp.
1976).
28. See notes 94-106 and accompanying text infra for an explanation of the rollback
tax.
29. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51050-51065, 51070-51073 (Deering 1974 & Supp.
1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-131a to -131m (1977); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1201
to -1219 (Michie Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 271.710-750 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, §§ 5001-5013 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
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interest, his property is assessed at its market value minus the value of
the rights and interests surrendered. In practical effect, there is little
difference between the conveyance of an open space easement for a
term of years and entering into a restrictive agreement for a like term.
Conceptually, however, there is no preferential assessment of land in
the first case because the assessor is simply assessing the remaining
property interests on the basis of their fair market value. Because of
this fact, open space easement programs have not been included in this
study.
Forest and timber taxation laws generally set the annual assessment
of eligible forest or timber lands at a very low level and provide for a
yield tax at time of harvest. 30 While the goals of these laws, giving a tax
break to the forest products industry and promoting conservation of
forest resources, overlap somewhat with the goals of the use-value
assessment statutes discussed here, they raise a set of issues which are
outside the scope of this Article.
Seven states have enacted classified property tax systems which
mandate different assessment-market price ratios for specified classes
of real property.3I Generally agricultural and residential properties are
assigned similar ratios which are lower than the ratios for industrial,
commercial, and utility properties. While granting some preferential
assessment for open land, these acts do not protect urban fringe land
from higher taxes due to rising market values if the ad valorem princi-
ple is maintained. The fact that residential and agricultural property are
often given the same ratio indicates that agricultural use is not pref-
erentially assessed relative to its major competitor. Because these pro-
visions are not aimed specifically at agricultural and open lands and
involve different concepts than the laws discussed here, they have not
been included in the table.
2. Notes to Table 1
a. Eligible Uses
Agriculture: The definition of qualifying agricultural uses varies across
programs, but is generally quite broad, ranging from requiring land to
30. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1.1-6-1 to 6-1.1-6-27 (Burns Supp. 1977). W.
Klemperer, Evaluating Forest Tax Alternatives for Oregon (Oregon Legislative Interim
Committee on Revenue 1975); L. Hargreaves & R. Jones, Forest Property Taxation,
Report No. 29 (Georgia Forest Research Council 1972).
31. Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 51 § 17 (1958); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 42.136 (West
Supp. 1977); Louisiana: LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18B; Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §
273.112 (West Supp. 1976); South Carolina: S.C. CODE § 65-1648 (Supp. 1975); Tennes-
see: TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-611 (Bobbs-Merrill 1976); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 11-
8-5 (1974).
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lay fallow for one year as a regular requirement of good agricultural
husbandry 32 to requiring intensive cultivation. 33 Statutes usually pro-
vide that associated waste and wooded land is considered an agricul-
tural use, 34 but improvements on such land generally are not within the
statutory definition of agriculture.35
Open Space, Environmental Protection: The definition of these lands
is broad, but eligibility is usually contingent on approval by a public
body. 36 Critical natural, scenic, and historical resources are usually
included in the list of eligible lands. 37
Timber or Forest: While several states38 include this as an eligible use,
many also have forest taxation laws which provide greater benefits to
landowners.39
Within the statutes listed here, the intent behind the preferential
taxation of forest land may be different from that behind the preferen-
tial taxation of timber land, with the latter implying benefits to harves-
ters and the former a reward for resource conservation. However,
such distinctions are not apparent on the face of most statutes and the
words seem to have been used interchangeably to refer to heavily
wooded land. In several cases the eligibility of these lands hinges on
the approval of a state official, such as the State Forester.40
Recreation: These provisions are designed to benefit country clubs,
golf courses, ski areas, hunting grounds, and other recreational
facilities.
b. Additional Eligibility Requirements
Minimum Farm Income Required: This is typically worded in terms of
32. See, e.g., Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 215.203-2b (1975).
33. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.3 (West Supp. 1977). See City of E. Orange
v. Township of Livingston, 102 N.J. Super. 512, 246 A.2d 178 (1968), aff'd., 54 N.J. 96,
253 A.2d 546 (1969); cf., Andover Township v. Krymer, 140 N.J. Super. 399, 356 A.2d
418 (1976) (entire tract entitled to tax assessment on farmland despite the fact that only
100 acres of tract actually being farmed).
34. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 36, § 1102 (West Supp. 1976).
35. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 61A § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1977).
36. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2427 (West Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 84.34.010-.34.050 (Bancroft-Whitney/West Supp. 1976).
37. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 554.701-.719 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1287(1)-
1287(19) (Callaghan Supp. 1976)).
38. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9 §§ 8329-8331 (1974 & Supp. 1976); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 137.017 (Vernon Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-29-9 (Smith Supp. 1975).
39. See, e.g., The Western Oregon Ad Valorem Timber Tax Law, OR. REV. STAT. §
321.605-680 (1975). See also note 30 supra.
40. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1.1-6-1 to 6-1.1-6-27 (Burns Supp. 1977).
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a minimum required level of gross annual receipts with an additional
amount per acre in some cases. Some states require that the owner
must satisfy one or the other of these provisions, a requirement design-
ed to make speculators ineligible while including low-income subsist-
ence farmers. 41
History of Eligible Use Required: In these programs, the land must
have been in the eligible use for a number of years prior to application,
typically two years. 42
Minimum Length of Tenure Within Family: Programs listed here re-
quire that the land has been owned by the applicant's family for a
period of years. In North Carolina and Minnesota, this is seven years,
unless, in the latter, the applicant lives on the property.43
Land Must Be Planned or Zoned for the Eligible Use: These provi-
sions, which link preferential assessment to the land use planning
process, are rarely included in state statutory schemes. When they are,
their strictness and effectiveness vary greatly among the states. In
most of these programs, a use must be allowed under the zoning
ordinance to be eligible,4 but there is no provision that other uses
could not be allowed under the zoning category. Several states termi-
nate eligibility when the owner applies for a zoning change or files a
subdivision plan.45 Connecticut 46 and Washington47 have planning re-
quirements for lands in the "open space" category but not for farm-
land.
c. Sanctions on Conversion
While most penalties are assessed on conversion of the land to a
non-qualifying use, a few states assess the penalty either then or at
time of sale. Many programs specifically require notifications of
41. For instance, the Pennsylvania provision mandates that in order for land to be
considered to be in agricultural use, it must meet one of several requirements including
that "[s]uch land was devoted to agricultural use the preceding three years and is not less
than ten contiguous acres in area or has an anticipated yearly gross income of two
thousand dollars." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5490.3(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977); see Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 137.017 (Vernon Supp. 1976); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 84-437.2 (Smith
Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 10-6-31 to -33.5 (Smith Supp. 1977).
42. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.2 (West Supp. 1977); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5713.30 (Page Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-5-87 (Smith Supp. 1977).
43. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.111 subd. 3 (West Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
277.3(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 1975).
44. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 215.203, 215.213 (1975).
45. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b) (Michie Supp. 1976).
46. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-107b(c) (1977).
47. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 84.34.020 (Bancroft-Whitney/West Supp. 1976).
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changes in use, 48 and some provide additional penalties for failing to do
SO.
4 9
Rollback Taxes Collected: These are usually calculated as the differ-
ence between the taxes that would have been due at market value
assessment and the taxes actually paid under the program, summed
over the number of specified years. 50 For administrative simplicity,
several states have changed this to a multiple of the difference between
market and use-value taxes in the year of conversion. 51 In a market
with rising property values, this will produce a larger rollback.
Interest on Deferred Taxes: The interest rates range from 5% to 10%
and are usually not compounded. Michigan has compound interest for
early termination. 52
Penalty Based on Market Value in Year of Conversion: This is a
specified percentage of sale price or market value at conversion.
Other Penalty: For withdrawal before a specified number of years,
some states levy an additional penalty, such as a certain percentage of
the deferred taxes. 53
d. Restrictive Agreements
Minimum Length of Term: While the length of the term is negotiable in
most states, four out of the five states set a minimum length of term. 54
e. Scope of Program
A program is considered statewide if local assessors or governing
bodies have no choice in the acceptance of applications from lands that
meet the statutory eligibility requirements. In a very few cases, the
laws apply only to specified parts of the state.55
48. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 50la-2, para. 3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
49. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 308.395(2)(C) (1975). If the owner converts the land to
an ineligible use without notifying the assessor, he must pay a penalty equalling 20% of
the deferred taxes.
50. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.501(4) (West Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
54:4-23.8 (West Supp. 1977).
51. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b)(2)(a)(i) (Michie Supp. 1976); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 554.701 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1287(12)(4) (Callaghan Supp. 1977));
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79A:19(I) (Supp. 1975).
52. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.701 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1287 (1) (Callaghan Supp.
1977)).
53. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 84.34.070, .080, .090, .100 (Bancroft-
Whitney/West Supp. 1976).
54. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51244 (Deering Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.501 (West
Supp. 1977); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 554.704 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 1287(4) (Callaghan
Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2741 (Equity Supp. 1977).
55. Pennsylvania's first differential assessment statute, for instance, limited its
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In the voluntary programs, applications are required initially, and in
some cases annually.- 6 In the automatic programs, assessment regula-
tions for all specified lands are state mandated.
57
f. State Subvention Payments
State payments to offset the revenue loss attributable to differential
assessment are provided under only three programs. 58 In California,
these are tied either to the estimated tax loss or the acres of land in the
program, whichever is the lesser amount. 59 In New York, subventions
are provided only when the state initiates an agricultural district, which
has not happened to date.60
II. EFFECTIVENESS FOR PROVIDING TAX BENEFITS TO FARMERS AND
OTHER OWNERS OF ELIGIBLE LAND
A. General Considerations
As already indicated, a primary goal of differential assessment is to
reduce the real property taxes of farmers and other owners of eligible
land. 6' In many states, this appears to have been the only, or at least,
the overriding goal. In any case, the other goals, such as retarding the
conversion of open land to urban uses, the securing of recreational
benefits, the protection of scenic resources, and the controlling of
urban development, all depend on the magnitude of the tax benefit.
The larger it is, the more likely it is, so the argument goes, that owners
of undeveloped land will be induced to hold the land off the market and
maintain it in its current use.62 This section of the Article examines the
effectiveness of differential assessment by examining the tax benefits
which result and how they are affected by various types of programs.
The analysis which follows will, for purposes of simplification,
focus on farmers and farmland. Farmers are the primary beneficiaries
coverage to urban areas as defined by the census. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11941-11947
(1968). However this provision was removed in 1972.
56. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.035(b) (Michie 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 246-
10(a) (Supp. 1975).
57. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 42-136, -227 (West Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE ch. 2 §
63-202 (Supp. 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-4-13 (Bums Supp. 1976).
58. ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.035(e) (Michie 1976); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16100-70 (Deer-
ing 1973 & Supp. 1977); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 305(I)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
59. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16100-70 (Deering 1973 & Supp. 1977).
60. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 305(b) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
61. See notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text supra.
62. M. BENNETT & J. CLARK, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING PENNSYL-
VANIA'S NEW FARMLAND AND FOREST LAND ASSESSMENT Acr 10 (1975).
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of most differential assessment laws, and in almost every case factors
affecting tax savings for ihem will be similar to factors affecting
owners of timber, recreational, scenic and other types of undeveloped
land. Where different considerations come into play for these latter
classes of land, they will be noted.
The tax benefits which owners receive as a result of differential
assessment of land are measured by the difference between those
taxes which they would pay if they did not participate in the program
and those which they pay as participants. In evaluating the effective-
ness of a particular type of differential assessment program it is there-
fore essential to understand the context within which it operates. This
context can be best analyzed in terms of the interaction between rural
land market factors and property tax factors.
1. Land Market Factors and Property Tax Factors
Agricultural land is sold in two types of markets: the market for land
to be used to produce agricultural products and the market for devel-
opment sites.63 The first type exists in its purest form in rural areas
remote from the pressures of urbanization, where agriculture is the
highest bidding use. The second exists in suburban areas where little
farming occurs. In between, in the rural-urban fringe, the two markets
overlap, so that some land is sold for agricultural use, and some for
development, but at intermediate prices.
a. Remote Rural Areas
In remote rural areas, land values are a function of the annual
economic surplus (or net income) which a reasonably able farmer
estimates he can generate from the land, the capitalization rate a
prudent farmer assigns to this surplus (or to state it differently, the rate
of return which he will demand from his investment), and the ef-
fective property tax rate for the taxing jurisdiction in which the farm
is located.64 In such areas the property tax is based on agricultural use
value and therefore is a percentage of net income from the land. 6-
63. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
64. See generally Back, Land Value Taxation in Light of Current Assessment Theory
and Practice, in THE ASSESSMENT OF LAND VALUE 37 (D. Holland ed. 1970).
65. Where agriculture is the highest bidding use (or the "highest and best use"), land
value, V, will be a function of the net farm income, Y, the capitalization rate, C, and the
effective property tax rate, R. This relationship is expressed as follows:
Y
V-
C+R
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However, the impact of the tax is reduced because it is a deductible
item for federal income tax purposes.6
b. The Rural-Urban Fringe
In the second type of market, where -pressures from urban devel-
opment are at work, land values are bid up by buyers who will pay
more than the land is worth for agricultural use because they, in turn,
can develop it and sell it at a higher price to homebuyers and busi-
nesses. The difference between farm use value and fair market value
for development is the development value of the land. In the absence
of a differential assessment law or similar legislation, property tax
assessors are mandated to appraise land at its fair market value,
including both agricultural use value and development value.
As a result, assuming no de facto preferential assessment (where
assessors improperly hold appraised value at agricultural use value
levels), appraised values will rise as development values increase. The
farmer's taxes increase correspondingly, even though his net income
from agricultural activity remains at essentially the same level, all
other things being equal. The taxes, which are no longer related to his
net income attributable to farming, become a larger and larger compo-
nent of his costs, sometimes rising to the point where they equal or
exceed his net income before property taxes. The farmer may then be
caught in a classic income squeeze and may start to look for a buyer.
Differential assessment laws are designed toalleviate this squeeze by
In areas where agriculture is the highest bidding use, the appraised values which
property tax assessors use to establish the tax base should, in principle, be the agricultur-
al use value, and in such cases, the dollar value of the tax on the land, T, is:
T=R V
Substituting for V,
RY
T=
C+R
We may now express T as a proportion of the net farm income, Y, to obtain the tax rate
on the net income from farming, P:
T
Y
Substituting terms and simplifying,
RY
- RP=C+R-
- C+R
Y
Thus, for all levels of net income, the tax rate, P, on the net income is determined by the
magnitudes of the real property tax rate, R, and the capitalization rate, C.
66. I.R.C. § 164(a)(1).
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authorizing assessors to re-appraise eligible land according to its ag-
ricultural value and thereby re-establish net agricultural income as the
basis of the real property tax.
2. The Effect of Market and Property Tax Factors on Tax Savings
There are three factors relating to the land market and the real
property tax system in a particular landowner's taxing jurisdiction
which influence the magnitude of the tax benefits he might receive
from differential assessment.
The first factor is the difference between the assessed value of the
land based on fair market value and its assessed value based on
current-use or farm value. Obviously, farmers at the rural-urban fringe
would, in principle, enjoy the largest reduction, although the fact that
de facto preferential assessment of farmland is widespread in these
areas may, in practice, reduce the magnitude of the benefit. In these
areas, differential assessment would protect the farmer against future
increases in tax burden resulting from rising land value and reassess-
ment.
The second factor is the percentage which the assessed value of
farm land and associated real estate improvements, such as barns,
throughout the taxing jurisdiction, is of the total assessed value tax
base before the establishment of differential assessment. If all realty in
the jurisdiction is in eligible agricultural use, there would be no benefit
to an individual farmer. The assessed value of his land would be
reduced, but since the tax revenue needs of the municipality would
remain the same, his tax rate would go up by an amount sufficient to
produce the same tax revenue, and his tax bill would remain unchang-
ed. At the other extreme, if there is a very small amount of eligible land
in a jurisdiction, the tax saving for its owner would be proportional to
the reduction in assessment. This matter is fully discussed below.
The third factor is the percentage which the assessed value of the
improvements on a particular farm is of its total assessed value before
differential assessment. The tax benefit usually involves only taxes on
land, and improvements continue to be assessed at fair market value.
In general, if an individual owner is to be better off after the institution
of a differential assessment program, the percentage of his farm's
value which is in eligible land must be at least as large as the percent of
the entire tax base which is in eligible land. Thus, not all farmers will
enjoy a net benefit from a differential assessment program. Those with
a high proportion of improvement value to land value may see their tax
bills rise, even though their land is assessed at a lower rate.
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B. Program Factors and the Provision of Tax Benefits
For a given configuration of rural land market and property tax
factors, the tax benefits a landowner receives will be determined by a
third set of variables. These are the "program factors" established by
the relevant differential assessment legislation and associated adminis-
trative regulations and practices which determine eligibility, method of
assessment, sanctions, and so forth.
The three principal forms of differential assessment, preferential
assessment, deferred taxation and restrictive agreements, can be
viewed most usefully as sets of progressively more restrictive provi-
sions, variations of which have been used by different states. Thus, all
differential assessment laws grant preferential assessment. To evalu-
ate this technique, this section of the Article will examine the major
types of eligibility criteria, methods of assessment and non-tax bene-
fits which different states have included in their laws, to see how they
expand or contract eligibility and increase or decrease tax benefits.
Most states have added rollback provisions to capture some or all of
the taxes deferred. 67 In addition, this section analyzes how variations
in rollback taxes affect the achievement of the goal of making tax
benefits available to farmers. Finally, five states have added a legal
sanction to the economic one of deferred taxation and have required
eligible owners to sign long-term restrictive agreements which tie up
their land for a specified period. 68 These provisions also will be ex-
amined in light of their effect on the achievement of the above goals.
The analysis which follows will start with provisions of differential
assessment laws which provide the greatest tax benefits and the most
attractive programs for farmers and examine how other provisions
successively narrow the class of eligible land and reduce the total tax
benefits conferred on the class of eligible owners.
1. Preferential Assessment
a. Eligibility Criteria
The best example of a law with broad eligibility criteria is Indiana.69
There, all land which is devoted to agricultural use is to be assessed as
67. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.035(a) (Michie 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §
19(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.8 (West Supp. 1977).
68. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 421-429 (Deering 1975 & Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 193.501 (West Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.701-.719 (Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§ 26.1287(1)-1287(19) (Callaghan Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 79A:15-21
(Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2741 (Equity Supp. 1977).
69. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-4-13 (Bums Supp. 1976).
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agricultural land. The local assessor makes the determination as to
whether land is in agricultural use, and once it is so classified, it
automatically receives preferential assessment. 70 Thus, all farmland in
the state receives preferential assessment.
Several states have enacted additional criteria which limit eligibili-
ty.71 Their primary goal has been to exclude speculators and other non-
farmers from the benefits of the program.72 A few states require that
the owner must receive a certain amount of gross income per acre or a
minimum percentage of his income from the land.73 In many states, it is
necessary for the owner to apply for differential assessment. 74 This
may be a fairly simple procedure with automatic renewal from year to
year, or it may involve the preparation of a survey, the submission of
plat plans, and the payment of a substantial fee, as in California. 75 In
some states, such as North Carolina, it is necessary to review the
application every year.76 Eligibility is further limited by some states
which have prescribed planning and zoning requirements designed to
limit participation to those properties which have been designated in a
plan as open space or have been zoned for that purpose.77
Florida's preferential assessment law has two interesting eligibility
provisions. One allows a board of county commissioners to deny
eligibility to lands which are contiguous to urban or metropolitan
development where the board finds that "the continued use of such
lands for agricultural purposes will act as a deterrent to the timely and
orderly expansion of the community. ' 78 The second creates a rebutt-
70. STATE BD. OF TAX COMM'RS, INDIANA REAL PROPERTY APPRAISAL MANUAL at F 1
(1968).
71. COLO. REV. STAT. § 137-1-3(6)(a)(i) (Michie 1973) (history of eligible use); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 8329-8331 (1974) (history of eligible use); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §
8333 (1974) (minimum farm income); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 137.017 (Vernon Supp. 1977)
(minimum farm income).
72. For instance, Texas requires that the owner must be a natural person whose farm
business is his primary occupation and source of income. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-
d(a), (e).
73. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84.437.2(b) (Smith Supp. 1976); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, § 5490.3(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
74. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-484(A) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 54:4-23.1 (West Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11943 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
75. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51248 (Deering Supp. 1977); UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, note 8
supra, at 294.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-277.4(a) (Michie Supp. 1975).
77. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51230 (Deering Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. §§
215.203, .213 (1975). In California, land must be in an agricultural preserve so designated
in a general plan and must be suitably restricted by zoning or some other means to
permissible uses within two years thereafter.
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.461(4)(b) (West Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 14:11
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol14/iss1/3
DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT STATUTES
able presumption that land which sells for three or more times the
agricultural assessment placed on the land is not used primarily for
agricultural purposes.
79
For several reasons, there is no way of determining empirically what
percentage of otherwise eligible land in a given state will be excluded
by a particular eligibility criterion. First, most states do not have an
accurate inventory of land in agricultural or other eligible uses, so that
the universe of potentially eligible land is not well-defined. Second,
owners may be receiving substantial de facto preferential assessment,
so that they have little incentive to enroll. Third, an owner who
contemplates development in the near future may not think it worth-
while to enroll. Fourth, no data are available on an aggregate basis
concerning such factors as years in agricultural use, gross income per
acre, length of ownership, acreage owned by corporations, or owner's
income, which would allow one to determine how many acres of land
were rendered ineligible because of failure to meet a particular crite-
rion. Thus, we are left with the simple argument based on the logic that
the more eligibility criteria there are, the smaller will be the percentage
of farmers who actually enroll in the program and receive tax benefits.
b. Methods of Assessment: The Magnitude of the Tax Benefit
In evaluating the effectiveness of differential assessment for confer-
ring tax benefits, it is necessary to examine not only the inclusiveness
of eligibility criteria, but also the magnitude of the assessment differ-
ential which an eligible farmer is accorded. This, in turn, is influenced
by the method used by assessors to re-establish agricultural net income
as the primary determinant of appraised value and, consequently, of
assessed value and property tax burden.
To determine agricultural use value, assessors may use one of three
basic methods. One is to estimate value directly based on data on
comparable sales.80 A second is to estimate the capitalized value which
is consistent with the agricultural productivity of the land and a com-
monly accepted capitalization rate.81 The third involves the use of land
value tables which have been constructed on the basis of soil prod-
uctivity ratings.82
79. Id.
80. California's Williamson Act permits assessors to use comparable sales data, but
only if they can show by convincing evidence that the use restriction imposed by the
restrictive agreement will be removed in the predictable future. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE
§ 423 (Deering Supp. 1977). This has meant, in practice, that such data are not used.
81. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 308.345(3) (1975).
82. Maryland's Department of Assessment and Taxation has prepared a table which
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The comparable sales method of appraisal derives the fair market
value of one property from recent sales data of other properties with
similar location, accessibility, productivity, size, and so on. Such a
method is often not appropriate for farm use value appraisal because
the other sales prices often are significantly affected by development
value. Most of the states studied in detail do not use comparable sales.
Where the capitalization of income approach is used, assessors
normally attempt first to determine income by looking at rental data to
determine what rent a particular tract could be expected to bring. 83 If
reliable rental information is not available, assessors will estimate the
income which the land can be reasonably expected to yield under
prudent management, after deducting appropriate operating expenses
and capital charges.84
Capitalization rates vary considerably from state to state, and from
year to year, because they are often set administratively in accordance
with legislative criteria. 85 The capitalization rate in 1975 was 5% in
Maryland,86 8% in Oregon,87 8.5% in Washington8 and 10% in New
Jersey.89 Effective tax rates on agricultural land (the percentage which
the tax is of fair market value) generally range between 1% and 2.75%,
so that income from the land may be capitalized at a rate varying from
7% or 8% to 11% or 12%.
Several analysts have noted that capitalization rates expected by
buyers of agricultural land are usually in the 2% to 4% range. These
classifies soil into six classes and assigns a full market value to each one. See UNTAXING
OPEN SPACE, note 8 supra, at 38.
83. However, in many areas, such as New Jersey, rental values are distorted by the
very existence of differential assessment. Investors and developers often are willing to
rent out land to a nearby farmer for little more than the real property taxes attributable to
the land, so as to qualify it as agricultural land in order to obtain the benefits of
differential assessment. Observed rents in such situations may bear little relationship to
the net income attributable to the land in agricultural use.
84. E.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 423 (Deering Supp. 1977); UNTAXING OPEN
SPACE, supra note 8, at 274-79.
85. For instance, in California, the State Board of Equalizations must fix the rate
each year at the level of the yield rate for long term United States Government bonds as
most recently published by the Federal Reserve Board. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 423
(Deering Supp. 1977). In Oregon, the Department of Revenue sets the rate at "the rate of
interest charged by the Farm Credit Administration averaged over the past five years,
plus a component for the local tax rate." OR. REV. STAT. § 308.345(3) (1975).
86. See UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, note 8 supra, at 134.
87. Id. at 204.
88. See WASH. DEP'T OF REVENUE, PROPERTY TAX BULLETIN 74.14 (1974); UNTAXING
OPEN SPACE, note 8 supra.
89. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, note 8 supra, at 152.
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rates are lower than those demanded by investors in other markets,
such as that of commercial realty, largely because there is good reason
to expect rural land values to rise at the rate of 5% or more per year, so
that net return from the land ranges between 7% and 9%.90 A method
of assessment which uses a higher than agricultural land market
capitalization rate produces current use value which is lower than the
"real" use value for which one farmer could sell his land to another. It
thus amounts to a preference on top of a preference.
Some states such as Indiana and Maryland, either by statute or by
regulation, prescribe values based on soil productivity ratings. 9' Local
assessors determine the appropriate average productivity rating for a
particular tract and then use the table provided to arrive at estimated
true cash value for farm use. The appeal of productivity rating lies
primarily in the fact that local assessors are not burdened with the
work involved in computing the income attributable to each tract of
land. Ratings have been criticized because they fail to take into ac-
count many of the factors which affect farm land values, such as
location, accessibility, and differential suitability for different kinds of
crops. 92
In summary, the magnitude of the tax benefits which a particular
program provides will be significantly influenced by the method of
assessment used. If the comparable sales technique is used, as is
possible in some states, development value will be included in fair
market value. If this is done, the differentially assessed value will be
raised and consequently the tax benefit conferred will be reduced. If
productivity ratings are used, they may understate agricultural use
value. In addition, where such ratings are used across an entire state,
they will not take into account locational differences, such as rainfall
and accessibility to markets. Thus, they will underestimate agricultural
use value in some areas, and overestimate it in others. Where the
capitalization of income method is used, generous estimates of income
will result in higher agricultural use value; while conservative esti-
mates will lower it. Capitalization rates will also have a significant in-
fluence on the magnitude of tax benefits. We have seen that capitaliza-
90. See, e.g., Ferraro, Valuation of Property Interests for Ad Valorem Taxation of
Extractive Industry and Agricultural Realty, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRA-
TION 134 (A. Lynn, ed. 1969).
91. STATE BD. OF TAX COMM'RS, INDIANA REAL PROPERTY APPRAISAL MANUAL at F-5
(1968); MARYLAND DEP'T OF ASSESSMENT AND TAXATION, GUIDE TO VALUATING AND
ASSESSING LANDS DEVOTED TO FARM AND AGRICULTURAL USE reprinted in UNTAXING
OPEN SPACE, note 8 supra, at 134.
92. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT OF FARMLAND NEAR
CrES 28-29 (1967).
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tion rates vary from as low as 5% in Maryland to as high as 10% in New
Jersey. 93 A New Jersey farm which is identical in all other relevant
respects to a Maryland farm would be appraised at approximately half
the appraised value of the Maryland farm and receive correspondingly
greater tax benefits.
2. Deferred Taxation
Thirty states (including three restrictive agreement states), with a
total of thirty-five different differential assessment programs, have
included provisions designed to recapture some or all of the taxes
which farmers and other owners of undeveloped land were excused
from paying pursuant to the programs. 94 These convert what, under
pure preferential assessment is a tax abatement program, into a full or
partial tax deferral program. Tax deferral creates an overhanging con-
tingent liability for back taxes in the statutorily mandated amount
which becomes a legal obligation when the land is converted to non-
eligible uses, or, in some states, such as Oregon,95 when the owner
initiates a rezoning to residential, commercial or industrial uses. Some
states, such as Washington, % impose an additional penalty in the form
93. See notes 85-88 and accompanying text supra.
94. ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.035 (Michie 1976); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51205, CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 421-429 (Deering Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 137-1-3(5) to
-3(6) (Michie 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-13(a) to -131n, 12-107a to -107f, -504a
to -507h (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 246-12, -12.3 to .4 (Dedication Program), -10
(Deferral Program) (Supp. 1975); ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 4(b); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §§
501(a)(1)-501(1)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 132.010,.190-
.200 (Baldwin 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47.2301-.2309 (West Supp. 1977); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 36, §§ 1101-1118 (West Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b) (Michie
Supp. 1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS: ch. 61A, §§ 1-24 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1977); MICH.
COMp. LAWS §§ 554.701-.719 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1287(1)-.1287(19) (Callaghan
Supp. 1976)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.111 (West Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§§ 84-401, -429.12, -437.1 to .17 (Smith 1974 & Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-1343
to -1346 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 361.325, 361A.010-.160 (Assessment of
Agricultural Property), .170-.250 (Assessment of Open-Space Property) (1975); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 79A:1-:14 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:4-23.1 to .23 (West
Supp. 1977); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 300-307 (MrKinney Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 105-277.2 to .7 (Michie Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5713.30-.39 (Page
Supp. 1976); OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 8; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 308.345-.403, 215.203-.263
(1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11941-11947; tit. 72, §§ 5490.1-.13 (Purdon Supp. 1977);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 44-27-1 to -6, -5 to -12, -39 to -41 (1970); S.C. CODE §§ 65-1605.1 to .2
(Michie Supp. 1975) as amended by Act 750, 1976 S.C. Acts; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-
650 to -658 (Bobbs-Merrill 1976); TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-d; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-5-
87 to -105 (Smith Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2741 (Development Rights
Program) (Equity Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §§ 58-769.4 to .15:1 (Michie Supp. 1977);
WASH. REV. CODE § 84.34.010 (Bancroft-Whitney/West Supp. 1976).
95. OR. REV. STAT. § 308.397 (1975).
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 84.34.010 (Bancroft-Whitney/West Supp. 1976).
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of a percentage of the taxes due, if the owner converts prematurely or
without giving appropriate notice. A few states, such as Connecticut 97
and New Hampshire,98 impose a conveyance tax at the time of sale
which has a similar economic effect but is calculated without reference
to taxes foregone. Massachusetts has both a deferred tax and a con-
veyance tax.99
The methods of computing these deferred, or rollback taxes vary
considerably. The smallest rollback is two years back taxes on untaxed
development value without interest,100 while the largest is in Hawaii
which under its dedication program, requires ten or twenty years
rollback, depending on which term of dedication is chosen.'10 Since in
most cases the average effective property tax rate on farmland in the
urban fringe is in the 1.2% to 2.75% range,'0 a five year rollback of
taxes would amount to at most 14% of the development value of the
land (or the difference between fair market value and the current use
value determined by assessors).
It can be stated that as a general rule, deferred taxes will constitute
between 2% and 15% of the fair market value of the land at the time of
conversion depending on effective tax rates, rollback term, market
value and current use value. Since these payments are, in most cases,
classified as taxes rather than penalties, they are deductible for federal
income tax purposes 0 3 and also are not treated as capital expenses,
which would require them to be treated only as reductions to cost basis
for capital gains purposes.'04 A few states have enacted provisions
imposing a conveyance tax on land which has been enrolled in a
differential assessment program and then converted to a non-eligible
use. 105
97. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-504a (1977).
98. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79A:7 (Supp. 1975).
99. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 61A, §§ 7, 12 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1977).
100. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.8 (West Supp. 1977).
101. HAW. REV. STAT. § 246-10(f)(3) (Supp. 1975).
102. See note 10 supra.
103. I.R.C. § 164(a)(1).
104. Id.
105. New Hampshire, for instance, requires payment of a tax equal to 10% of the
assessed value at the time of conversion. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79A:7 (Supp. 1975).
Connecticut has a declining conveyance tax on lands withdrawn from the program within
the first ten years of classification or ownership, whichever is earlier. The tax liability
starts at 10% of sale price in the first year of ownership and declines 1% annually to 1%
in the tenth year, and none thereafter. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12.504a (1977).
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These deferred taxation and conveyance tax provisions have two
principal objectives. First, they are designed to capture some of the tax
revenues lost because of the differential assessment program. Second,
they are designed to deter owners of land which have received tax
benefits from converting their land. Whether or not it has such an
effect will be considered more fully in the next section.
Suffice it to say here, that the inclusion of deferred tax liability or
conveyance taxes conflicts with the goal of providing tax benefits to
farmers. First, it will deter some farmers from entering the program
because the mere deferral of taxes may not be a sufficient inducement
to enroll, especially if the owner will have to pay interest on these
amounts at rates as high as 10%, as in Washington. 106 This will be
especially true when there is currently de facto preferential taxation.
Second, farmers who do enroll and later develop their land will obvi-
ously derive lower tax benefits from the program than they would from
pure preferential assessment, although for the long-term farmer, the
difference may not be important.
3. Restrictive Agreements
Of the five programs 07 which have been classified as bona fide
restrictive agreement programs, only California's has been used exten-
sively and long enough to warrant analysis.l0
Under California's Williamson Act, 109 an owner of eligible land may
enter into a contract with the county or city in which the land is
located, under which he agrees to maintain the land in eligible uses.
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 84.34.010 (Bancroft-Whitney/West Supp. 1976).
107. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51200-51205, CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 421-429 (Deering
Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.501 (West Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
554.701-.719 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1287(l)-.1287(19) (Callaghan Supp. 1976); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 79A:15-:21 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2741 (Equity
Supp. 1977).
108. California's Williamson Act was passed in 1965, and since has been used exten-
sively. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51205 (Deering Supp. 1977). In 1975, some 14,250,000
acres (approximately 30% of the privately owned land in the state) had been enrolled
under it. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 8, at 271. Florida's statute relates only to
recreational and park land. Michigan's statute, enacted in 1974, is too new. New
Hampshire's statute is also new, having been enacted in 1973, and relates only to open
space land, and Vermont's statute, while it covers farmland, is a special case in that it
authorizes land owners to contract with town governments to set assessed values and tax
rates for a period not to exceed ten years.
109. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51205 (Deering Supp. 1977). See UNTAXING OPEN
SPACE, supra note 8, at 271-302; Hansen & Schwartz, Prime Land Conservation: The
California Land Conservation Act, 31 J. OF LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION 198 (1976).
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The contract is for a period of ten years and is automatically renewed
each year for an additional year. If the owner gives notice of non-
renewal, he becomes liable for taxes according to a complex statutory
formula. In the first year after non-renewal, taxes generally are ap-
proximately 60% what they would be if the land were assessed on the
basis of fair market value. Each year for the rest of the run-out period
they increase gradually until, at the end of ten years, they are at market
value rates. The owner may also attempt to cancel the contract, but to
do this he must obtain the approval of the city or county and pay a
cancellation fee equal to 12.5% of the fair market value of the land. It
is possible to have the cancellation fee waived, but to do this, he must
secure the approval of the secretary of the state resources agency.
The essential feature of the restrictive agreement approach which
distinguishes it from other types of differential assessment programs is
that the owner is reasonably certain that he will not be able to develop
his land until the end of the run-out period. A farmer contemplating
enrolling in this type of restrictive agreement program will be faced
with the question of whether he wants to tie up his land for at least ten
years and pay taxes during the run-out period totaling at least 50% of
what he would otherwise pay. The clear evidence in California is that
only those owners who are certain that they will not convert their land
within ten or fifteen years have signed up under the Williamson Act.110
Thus, the restrictive agreement approach is clearly inconsistent with
the general goal of providing tax benefits to farmers. Those farmers
who are most in need of tax relief, because their land is located in
urbanizing areas with rising fair market values and tax rates, will be
precisely the ones least likely, for economic reasons, to tie up their
land for a number of years. Those who are in rural areas with the least
development pressure will be the ones who enroll. The intended major
beneficiaries of a differential assessment program, farmers in the
rural-urban fringe, would not receive its benefits.
In summary, differential assessment is a generally effective means
for conferring tax benefits on participating landowners. The amount of
the taxes saved by individual farmers will vary substantially, however,
depending on a number of factors. The greater the development value
(exclusive of farm use value) of the land, the greater the reduction in
assessment. In suburbanizing areas, a reduction of over 90% is possi-
110. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 8, at 293; Hansen, & Schwartz, Prime Land
Conservation: The California Land Conservation Act, 31 J. OF LAND AND WATER
CONSERVATION 198, 202 (1976).
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ble; in areas with little development pressure the reduction may be
minimal. In order, however, to make up for the reduced total assess-
ment in the taxing district, the general tax rate must be increased. This
increase will be small if there is a large amount of non-participating
property to share the burden of the loss in assessment. Therefore, the
smaller the proportion of the total tax base (before differential assess-
ment) accounted for by land in the program, the larger the savings to a
participating land owner. The few remaining farms in a generally built-
up township will thus receive the highest tax savings. Similarly, if the
tax base was made up of predominantly participating land, tax
savings would be small.
If, however, the assessed value of an individual participating proper-
ty includes a large proportion of non-eligible buildings and land, tax
savings for that owner will be generally small. Also, if de facto differ-
ential assessment existed before the program, assessment itself might
change little because of the program, and could even increase.
The various types of differential assessment programs can be ar-
ranged in a very rough spectrum with respect to their effectiveness in
making tax benefits available and attractive to land owners. Pure
preferential assessment programs with few eligibility conditions and
methods of assessment which produce a low assessed value based on
current, agricultural use value, are most effective. They are easy for
owners to enter and award full abatement of taxes on the devlopment
value of land. As eligibility criteria are multiplied and tightened, fewer
will enroll and thereby receive tax benefits.
Deferred or rollback tax payments reduce the economic attractive-
ness of the program for some farmers and thus deter some from
enrolling their land. The longer the rollback and the higher the interest
rate, the less incentive there is for the farmer to enter his land in the
program.
The restrictive agreement approach is least effective for achieving
the goal of awarding tax benefits to owners of eligible land because
the prospect of being locked in, unable to develop their land but paying
near market-value property taxes, will deter many owners from putting
their land under contract. Only those who are living in essentially rural
areas or are wholly committed to agricultural activity, and who do not
expect to develop their land within the period of the contract, will be
likely to be compensated for the costs resulting from the forced post-
ponement of conversion.
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III. EFFECTIVENESS: ACHIEVING LAND USE OBJECTIVES
A major objective of differential assessment legislation in many
states has been to keep farm and other rural land in its current use, or
at least to reduce its rate of conversion to urban uses."' Planners and
conservationists have argued that a significant percentage of sales of
farmland for development occurred because of the profit squeeze felt
by the farmers, especially in rural-urban fringe areas. They reasoned
that a program which would lower or put a ceiling on one of the
farmer's major cost components, the real property tax, would lessen
the squeeze and therefore reduce the number of forced sales. The
validity of this line of reasoning, and the effectiveness of differential
assessment legislation with respect to its primary goals of maintaining
current, open use will be explored in this section.
The effectiveness of differential assessment laws for maintaining
current use of undeveloped land depends on how many farmers who
are considering conversion will enroll, and on how large an economic
incentive they will receive if they refrain from converting.
Differential assessment can influence the rate of conversion of farm
and other open land in two principal ways. First, a farmer's total
production cost may be lessened, and his land made more profitable,
by a substantial reduction in his property taxes. This effect, which is
often viewed as an attempt to lessen the income squeeze which farm-
ers in the rural-urban fringe experience, has been the principal focus of
legislators when they speak of preventing forced conversions. The
reduction in taxes may be especially significant in metropolitan areas
or areas with a large potential for second home development, since in
such places the differences between current use value and fair market
value may be large. In these areas, fair market value may be as much
as fifteen or twenty times current use value.1 2 Where there is no de
facto differential assessment, a differential assessment program in
such cases could reduce a landowner's property taxes by as much as
Ill. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-107a to -107f (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
193.461 (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-29-9 (Smith Supp. 1977); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 308.345-.403 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5490.1-.13 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
See also Atkinson, The Effectiveness of Differential Assessment of Agricultural and
Open Space Land, 36 AM. J. OF ECON. AND SOC. 197 (1977); Lapping, Bevins &
Herbers, Differential Assessment and Other Techniques to Preserve Missouri's Farm-
lands, 42 Mo. L. REV. 369 (1977); Nelson, Differential Assessment of Agricultural Land
in Kansas: A Discussion and Proposal, 25 KAN. L. REV. 215 (1977); Roe, Innovative
Techniques to Preserve Rural Land Resources, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 419 (1976).
112. Interview with William Riley, Director, Maryland Dept. of Taxation (Feb. 11,
1975).
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90%. Because property taxes consume an average of 10.4% of farmers'
net income,I 3 it is reasonable to suppose that tax reductions, or at least
deferrals, of this magnitude will enable some farmers to continue
farming over the short term.
The second way in which differential assessment could serve the
goal of maintaining current use is by making it possible for people
wishing to buy land for farming to reduce their potential carrying cost
sufficiently (by reducing taxes) so that they could pay more for the
land and out-bid potential developers. Unless farmers can pay nearly
as much as developers, the question is when, and not whether, proper-
ty will be converted to more profitable uses.
A. Supply and Demand and the Decision to Sell
Differential assessment changes the carrying costs of farmers' land.
Whether such changes result in decreasing the rate at which land is
converted to urban uses is another question. In order to answer it, it is
necessary to examine the decision-making process which a farmer goes
through when faced with a chance to sell his farm. Special emphasis
will be given to the role real property taxes play in that process.
Further, the issue of whether tax reductions can function as an incen-
tive not to sell will also be examined.
Decisions to sell and convert are affected by both supply and de-
mand considerations. The supply of farmland for conversion purposes
is affected by the price offered for land, the farmer's costs of prod-
uction including property taxes, his cash receipts, a number of demog-
raphic and personal factors, and possible externalities generated by
other nearby activities. In addition, government programs and policies
may indirectly contribute to a farmer's decision to sell. Estate and
inheritance taxes may, for example, induce sale and conversion in
some instances. 1 4
The demand for farmland for conversion arises because individuals
or groups desire to convert the land to such nonagricultural uses as
suburban homes or businesses, second homes, strip mines or even
timber production. The relative strength of the demand for farmland
and the economic, demographic, personal and other factors affecting
the supply of farmland for conversion will determine how much ag-
ricultural land disappears in any locality.
113. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REVISED ESri-
MATES OF TAXES LEVIED ON FARM REAL PROPERTY, 1960-73, BULL. No. 538 (1975).
114. Larocca & Maidenburg, The Effect of Federal Tax Policy on Land Conversion:
A Case Study of Baltimore County 1-3 (The Urban Institute 1974).
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It is important to keep in mind that reduction of agricultural property
taxes is aimed primarily at one part of the supply of agricultural land
for conversion, but that the effectiveness of such a reduction depends
upon many other supply and demand conversion factors as well.
1. Supply Factors and the Farmer's Decision to Sell" 5
Interviews with farmers and county agents and previous research
have identified four major classes of factors in the farmer's decision to
sell. These four factors are "economic,' 1 6 "demographic,""17 "sec-
ondary or indirect" (such as externalities from nearby nonfarm ac-
tivities) and "transitional"" 8 (such as a desire for change in either type
of work or place of work).
In general, each of the four major classes of factors influencing the
decision to sell is a function of the market price of the land-the higher
the price, the more likely the farmer is to sell.
Within the universe of general factors affecting the farmer's deci-
sion to sell, property taxes are only one component of the economic
factors. If a reduction of agricultural property taxes is to cause fewer
farmers to sell out, it will do so by shifting some farmers from insuffi-
cient net returns to sufficient net returns. Whether this shift can occur
115. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 8, at 49-56.
116. Economic factors are of central importance in a farmer's decision to sell. They
fall into two general groups: first, the price offered for the land may be so high that it is
most difficult not to sell, and second, the net returns to the agricultural operation of the
farm may be insufficient over the long run to warrant continued farming. Low net
returns may be due to low prices for farm output, low yields of crops or livestock
products, high costs of labor, and burdensome property and other taxes.
117. The demographic factor is concerned with the farmer's life cycle and the desires
of his children, if any exist, to take over the farm. As a farmer nears the age of
retirement, he is likely to consider selling his farm to a family member or, if none is
willing to continue farming, to a neighbor who, by enlarging his farm, can operate more
profitably. But if no such buyer exists, the farmer may put the farm up for sale in the
impersonal land market. Should the farmer die before the land is transferred, his estate
may be forced to sell it in order to pay estate taxes. Whether or not the land then remains
in agriculture depends on the demand for alternative uses.
118. Transitional and secondary factors are the remaining two classes of factors
influencing the supply of farmland for conversion. The transitional factor includes
change of residence, whether to a farm elsewhere or to a non-farm location, and change
of occupation. Under the term, "secondary factors," are lumped the externalities
generated by nearby nonagricultural activities which cause the farmer to sell. Among
these are: 1) local ordinances placing restrictions on spreading fertilizer, use of pes-
ticides, and on other farm activities which are objectionable to new residents in the area;
2) acid mine drainage or subsidence caused by nearby subsurface or strip-mining ac-
tivities; 3) air pollution from nearby industrial processors which damages crops; and 4)
increased traffic on farm roads, and inadvertent or wilful damage to crops by nearby
urbanites.
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also depends on long run trends of the other costs of production and on
the prices of agricultural output. It should be apparent that, except for
interdependencies among the reasons for selling, reduction of the
agricultural property tax will have little or no impact on the demog-
raphic, transitional and secondary factors in the decision to sell.
2. Research on Supply Factors
The influence of the property tax on the farmer's decision to sell
has, rather surprisingly, received only infrequent empirical attention
even though forty-four states have differential assessment laws of one
type or another. 119 Unfortunately, from the limited number of studies
available, it is not possible to draw any strong general conclusions
about the effect of property taxes on the sale, conversion, or abandon-
ment of farmland, since these studies present only a partially complete
picture of the noneconomic factors on the supply side and of variation
in the pressures for conversion on the demand side. Several studies,
however, are particularly noteworthy.
In a study of forty farmland sales in three New Jersey townships
from 1966 to 1970, the following reasons for selling were given: 120
% of All
Economic Considerations Reasons Given
Taxes were too high 28.6%
Land can no longer be rented at a profit 4.1%
The price was right 18.4%
Demographic Considerations
Retirement 22.4%
Transitional Considerations
Desire to move to another area 6.1%
Miscellaneous Considerations
Decrease the size of current farm operation 10.2%
Other 10.2%
Retirement, taxes, and price offered appear to have dominated the
respondents' thinking. It is of interest to note that of the fourteen
sellers mentioning higher taxes as a reason for sale, nine were from
urbanizing areas, five from urbanized areas, and none from rural
areas. 
12 1
119. See note 5 supra.
120. G. NAGEL & D. DERR, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE DATA ON PARTICIPANTS
IN THE NEW JERSEY FARM REAL ESTATE MARKET, 1966-1970 (New Jersey Agricultural
Experiment Station, Rutgers University 1972).
121. Id. Respondents to the survey could give more than one reason for deciding to
sell and several did so.
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Data from a study of land sales in Baltimore County, Maryland, 22
underscore the importance of life cycle considerations in the decision
to sell. Death or retirement accounted for 42% of all sales, title change
within family for 11% and moving to another area for an additional
13%.123 Economic considerations (including good price, unavailability
of farm labor, and unproductive farmland) totaled 31%. 124 Land which
was subsequently developed for residential use was especially likely to
have been made available through life cycle reasons. Eighty-five per-
cent of such land was sold because of death or retirement. 12 This study
also points out that use-value assessment laws enable farmland owners
to avail themselves of the private timing incentives that are built into
the federal estate and capital gains tax structure, thus reinforcing the
importance of life cycle considerations in the decision to sell.
Studies which have investigated specifically the influence of differ-
ential tax laws on farmers decisions to sell have reached similar re-
sults. When asked directly about the effect of the New Jersey Farm-
land Assessment Act on their decisions, 56% of the buyers and 59% of
the sellers questioned in the New Jersey study cited above said it had
no influence. 26 In another New Jersey study, 60% of participants
questioned stated that the Farmland Assessment Act would not influ-
ence their decision to sell, while 40% stated that the Act had been a
positive force in enabling them to continue to farm. 27 A 1973 question-
naire survey of several hundred applicants for Washington's open
space taxation program produced similar findings.' 28 One conclusion
from this study was that most "applicants do not feel that par-
ticipation in the program and the associated penalties would have
any effect upon their deciding to sell the land or change the land
use." 1 29 When asked if they would have to change land use within the
122. G. Peterson, Tax Policy and Land Conversion at the Urban Fringe (Land
Use Center Working Paper 0875-04, The Urban Institute 1974).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
127. A. Koch, H. Monill, & A. Hausamann, Implementation and Early Effects
of the New Jersey Farmland Assessment Act (Rutgers Experiment Station Bull. No. 830,
Rutgers University 1967).
128. J. Banon & J. Thompson, Impacts of Open Space Taxation in Washington,
(Washington Agricultural Experiment Station Bull. No. 772, Washington State Univer-
sity College of Agriculture 1973).
129. Id.
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next five years if denied current use assessment, only 14% of the
respondents said "yes." The majority said "no. ' 130 The authors cau-
tion, however, that few participants understood the penalties for with-
drawal from the program or the rollback penalties.
3. The Effect of Differential Assessment on the Agricultural Use
Value of Land
The general conclusion that differential assessment, by itself, is
likely to be an ineffective deterrent to conversion of farmland is shared
by other analysts. 131
The central finding which emerges is that, while the cost of a differ-
ential assessment program in a state is measured in terms of tax
expenditures to the great number of participating owners, the effec-
tiveness with respect to maintaining current use is measured only in
terms of the small number of farmers who are contemplating sale in a
given year and who are potentially susceptible to being influenced in
their decision to sell by a reduction of their property taxes. Even these
will be induced only to postpone sale until a time which fits more
appropriately into their own life plans.
If preservation of agricultural activities is a legitimate social goal,
intervention in both supply and demand processes must be undertaken.
Differential assessment addresses only a small part of the supply
process. To be more effective, a comprehensive program should be
designed to ameliorate economic and secondary disincentives to farm-
ing on the supply side and to channel urban expansion to nonagricultur-
al land on the rural-urban fringe on the demand side.
130. Id.
131. J. KOLESAR & J. SCHOLL, SAVING FARMLAND (1975); P. House, Farmland and
Farmland Owners on the Edge of a Growing City, with Special Emphasis on Tax
Problems-A Case Study of Rochester, New York (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Cornell University); K. Wisner, Effects of Agricultural Use-Value Assessments in
Washington County, Maryland (1971) (unpublished M.S. Thesis, University of Mary-
land); see also J. Kolesar & J. Scholl, Misplaced Hopes, Misspent Millions: A Report on
Farmland Assessment in New Jersey (Center for Analysis of Public Issues 1972).
It is noteworthy that, after remaining fairly constant at about $1 per $100 of the market
value of farmland from 1955 to 1973, average farm real estate taxes per $100 of fair
market value for the nation dropped to 0.80 per $100 of fair market value in 1976. See
1976 Handbook of Agricultural Charts 22, 22-23 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture). Whether
this is the beginning of a long-term trend toward lower effective tax rates on agricultural
land, and whether such a trend could be attributed to the widespread implementation of
differential assessments laws, are presently matters of conjecture.
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B. An Evaluation of Alternative Types of Differential Assessment
With Respect to Maintaining Current Use
1. Preferential Assessment
Sufficient data are not available from states, such as Indiana, with
pure preferential assessment to make possible a direct empirical analy-
sis of the extent to which pure preferential taxation programs have
been effective in slowing the loss of farm and other eligible land to
urban development. Based on the analysis of the preceding section,
however, it is safe to conclude the following.
If an owner wants to keep his land in open uses, but finds this is
financially difficult, the savings from preferential assessment may
prove critical in enabling him to attain his desire. If the owner, howev-
er, is indifferent, or actively looking for an opportunity to sell to a
developer, the tax savings from preferential assessment will not have
much effect in deterring him from selling.
If the owner has made his living by farming the land, he may wish to
sell when he grows older so that he will be able to retire. Future tax
savings then will be of little consideration to him. Also when the owner
dies, and does not have an heir who wants to continue the property in
its current use, such land will likely be sold on the market to the highest
bidder.
Whenever land is sold on the open market, the type of buyer will be
determined primarily by the potential of the land for development and
its suitability for agricultural production (and in some instances, its
potential for strip or other mining). Urban uses nearly always can
outbid agricultural uses, no matter how efficient and productive. Tax
savings will not be enough to make a difference.
Therefore, preferential assessment is likely to make a difference in
the rate of conversion to urban use primarily for land that is in the
hands of relatively young owners who are either:
I) farmers who want to continue to farm, and are in a location
where farming is not impeded by urban neighbors, or
2) people who want to maintain a country home.
For these people, the tax saving may be large enough to play a signifi-
cant role in their decision not to sell.
Preferential assessment has its principal effect on the supply of land
which is put on the market in that it reduces the carrying cost of land. It
has no effect on the major factor which determines demand: accessi-
bility to growing urban centers. It does, however, affect demand in
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that a potential buyer can bid more in the realization that for as long as
he keeps the land in approved open space uses, he too, will enjoy
lower carrying costs. In most cases, this additional amount will not be
enough to enable the farmer to outbid the developer. In addition, if the
developer can take advantage of the preferential assessment law, as he
can do in several states,132 the farmer's advantage will be nullified. The
result will be that the price of land is bid up and perhaps more land will
be purchased by potential developers taking advantage of lower carry-
ing costs.
Pure preferential assessment, because it invokes no sanctions
against participants who leave the program, should attract the max-
imum number of participants. However, the mere fact that more par-
ticipate probably will have little effect on the rate of conversion to
other uses. Only those owners who have a strong incentive, in addition
to the tax savings, to maintain their land in its current use are likely to
use the tax saving to maintain that use. Most of these owners would
probably participate even in a program with strong sanctions. The
others will enjoy the financial advantages of the tax reduction and then
sell when it is economically advantageous.
Thus, except for certain circumstances, preferential assessment is
not very effective in maintaining current use in urban fringe areas even
in the short run. In the long run, where death and retirement and the
demand for land for other uses play the major roles in the decision
process, it is of very little significance indeed.
2. Deferred Taxation
Provisions for deferred taxation, in addition to pure preferential
assessment, provide some deterrent to changing use. The purpose of
this section is to evaluate how great a deterrent deferred taxation can
be expected to be.
Deferred taxation or conveyance tax requirements are found in the
thirty-five differential taxation programs of thirty states. 133 The roll-
back requirements in fifteen programs simply require the payment of
the difference between taxes under preferential assessment and what
taxes would have been under market assessment for the number of
years stated in the rollback provision.134 In the remaining thirteen
132. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-4-13 (Bums Supp 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
54:4-23.1 to -23.6 (West Supp. 1977).
133. See notes 21 & 94 supra.
134. Id.
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programs, interest is also charged on the back taxes. 135 In addition,
several states have a conveyance tax which is determined by market
value at time of sale. 36
The rollback period is typically about five years, but is as short as
two years in a number of states 137 and as long as fifteen years for
certain types of land in Maine. 38 Stipulated interest rates are typically
6%, 139 but are as high as 10% in Hawaii."4
a. Rollback Without Interest
The penalty imposed by rollback without interest charge is minor. In
fact, it simply allows an owner to postpone paying certain taxes (in
excess of those based on agricultural value) until his land is developed.
This is equivalent to an interest-free loan to the owner.
Even the total amount of the rollback is not large in proportion to
market value. Tax rates are generally in the range of 1% to 3% of
market value, and the rollback taxes are computed only on the differ-
ence between farm value and market value. Therefore, even Oregon's
ten-year rollback would amount to no more than 30% of the difference
between assessed and market value. 41
b. Rollback With Interest Charge
The requirement of an interest charge could create a true penalty,
but only to the extent that the interest rate charged is higher than that
which a land owner would have to pay were he to borrow from a
commercial lending institution. The interest rate provisions in force
have not constituted a true penalty for conversion over the past several
years in any state, 42 except possibly Hawaii with its stipulated 10%
charge. 43 The tax rollback and interest charge, however, can consti-
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1112 (West Supp. 1977).
137. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-5-39 (Supp. 1976).
138. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1112 (West Supp. 1977).
139. See UNTAXINr OPEN SPACE, supra note 8, at 69.
140. HAW. REV. STAT. § 246-10(0(3) (Supp. 1975).
141. See UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 8, at 214-16.
142. This is so because if the interest rate charged on rollback taxes is equal to or less
than what the farmer would have to pay a commercial lending institution, it costs the
farmer the same or less than what he would have to pay such a lender to defer his taxes.
143. The 10% rate may be higher than commercial interest rates on loans to farmers.
1977]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
tute a substantial payment and, therefore, could have some psycholog-
ical effect on the decision to develop.
Studies by other researchers have also concluded that rollback even
with interest cannot offset the increased capital gain which is usually
realized when land is converted to urban uses. 44
Another view the owner might take is to compare his rollback costs
not to total market value, but to the appreciation in value of his proper-
ty during the period the rollback covers. He might argue (other things
being equal) that it was not advantageous for him to sell at the begin-
ning of the period. He will consider selling or developing therefore,
only if the appreciation in value during the period exceeds the total bill
he will have to pay for rollback taxes and interest.
Finally, some landowners may be deterred from entering a deferred
taxation program even if it might be in their economic interest to do so.
For them the prospect of being required to pay a large amount of back
taxes, in some states with interest, combined with the time and ex-
pense required to enroll their land, more than offsets the advantages of
a reduced assessment. A deferred taxation program will not be effec-
tive in influencing the decision of a landowner who has refrained from
entering into it.
c. Conclusions
Based on the above reasoning and computations, it is probably safe
to conclude that rollback requirements, even with substantial interest
payments, are not likely to be an effective deterrent to development.
This is particularly so in areas where development demand is strong
and land values are increasing rapidly.
Although rollback provisions would not seem to add greatly to the
effectiveness of preferential assessment in preventing the conversion
of land to urban uses, nonetheless, a sanction such as rollback is a
necessary provision from the standpoint of equity. Without a rollback
provision, preferential assessment laws provide a free ride for the
speculator, at the cost of others whose taxes are increased to make up
for the loss in revenue. It is only fair that this lost revenue be made up
to the public when conversion occurs. In the interest of fairness,
interest should be charged at a rate equal to the rate which other
taxpayers would have had to pay in order to provide the lost revenues.
144. See R. GLOUDEMANS, USE-VALUE FARMLAND ASSESSMENT (1974); D. Holland,
An Economic Analysis of Washington's Differential Taxation Program (College of
Agriculture Research Center, Circular 578, Washington State University Dec. 1974).
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3. Restrictive Agreements
Restrictive agreements (under which an owner agrees not to develop
his land for, say, ten years, knowing that the agreement will be enforc-
ed by a state or local agency) have considerable potential as a means of
maintaining current use, at least over the term of the contract. They
have not been particularly effective in maintaining current use in
California primarily because they are voluntary, and an owner of
eligible land may choose not to enroll his land.145 As is reported in a
recent study of California's Williamson Act, 146 while some 46% of
privately-owned eligible agricultural land in the state was under con-
tract in 1976, almost all of it was rural land not subject to near-term
development pressure. 147
The consensus of the literature is that only owners who are committ-
ed to agriculture and have no expectations of developing their land
within the next ten or fifteen years will put their land under contract.148
Those whose land is ripe for development, or who expect that it will be
within ten years, have, by and large, declined to enter the California
program.
One aspect of California's program may have a noticeable effect on
conversion rates. The program creates agricultural preserves within
which contracts may be written. 149 Participants have standing to pro-
test cancellation. By creating a legal structure aimed at preserving
agricultural use and vesting owners with an interest in maintaining the
integrity of the district, the system operates to retard change. This
effect may be more significant as a means of preserving current ag-
ricultural use than the simple economic incentive of preferential as-
sessment.
The potential usefulness of restrictive agreements, coupled with
differential assessment, lies in their use as a mandatory device which is
part of an overall conservation and development policy for metropoli-
tan areas. This approach in transitional areas, together with acquisition
of less-than-fee interests in lands designated for open space use and
subject to heavy development pressure, on the one hand, and simple
145. See note 110 supra.
146. Hansen & Schwartz, supra note 109, at 202.
147. Williamson Act Study Group, The Property Tax and Preservation of Open Space
Land in California: A Study of the Williamson Act 80 (Stanford Environmental Law
Society 1974).
148. Land Research Group, Measures for Strengthening the California Land Conser-
vation Act 55 (Division of Environmental Studies, University of California-Davis 1974).
149. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51230 (Deering Supp. 1977).
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police power regulation of land not subject to heavy pressure, on the
other, would provide a flexibility which is much needed. The useful-
ness of the restrictive agreement alone for maintainance of current use
is effectively limited by its voluntary nature.
C. Conclusions Concerning the Achievement of Land Use Objectives
Except for a few specific situations, which account for a small
fraction of potential sales of farmland, differential assessment is not
likely to be effective in achieving land use objectives. Whether or not a
particular farm is sold and converted to non-open space use depends
on three sets of considerations: supply factors, demand factors and
governmental approval of the proposed development. Differential as-
sessment operates primarily on one of the supply factors, by reducing
the income squeeze which farmers in rural-urban fringe areas experi-
ence as a result of rising real property taxes. It has a secondary impact
on the demand side because it permits farmer-buyers, speculators and
developers either to offer somewhat more for the land or to buy more
land at the same price because their carrying costs are reduced. This
latter effect is difficult to appraise, but is likely to be marginal because
the buyer will normally be simply exchanging tax costs on the land for
interest costs on the money he has to borrow either to pay the higher
price or to buy additional land.
It is clear, however, that all forms of differential assessment help to
insulate the farmer from market pressures to sell which come to bear
on him in the form of higher property taxes based on rising property
values. They make it easier for him to schedule the sale of his land at a
time, such as retirement, which fits into his estate planning.
One of the central issues raised by differential assessment with
respect to the goal of maintaining current use is which of the systems
for timing the sale and conversion of land is best:
1. a system which keys the conversion of open land into personal
life cycle and estate planning considerations of individual farmers;
2. a system which relies on the push of rising property taxes and
the pull of high offers to ease land into development; or
3. a system which relies more heavily on governmental resource
and development planning to specify which land should be developed
when.
Studies have documented the additional economic, environmental
and energy costs which are associated with low density, leap-frogging
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development, 150 precisely the kind which Peterson found in his study
of differential assessment in Maryland.' 5' In light of these findings, it
seems clear that differential assessment programs which are not part of
a comprehensive land development regulation system are counter-
productive in terms of the broader goals of urban development.
The benefits which they provide for individual farmers by way of
short-term postponement of some conversions are more than coun-
terbalanced by the disadvantages they entail in creating special tax
shelters in which owners of developable land may thrive until their
personal economic plans coincide with those of the market generally.
Such programs should either be amended or made a part of a larger
system of resource management and development regulation. Such a
system would entail the designation of agricultural and development
districts, staging of capital facilities and development, compensation,
and differential assessment.
IV. TAX EQUITY, EASE OF ADMINISTRATION AND
POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
Tax shifts resulting from differential assessment raise the major
issues concerning equity. Whether or not farmers are paying excessive
property taxes is initially a political issue and, in any event, a factual
question on which the evidence is not clear. It is evident, however, that
differential assessment programs work by shifting some of the burden
of the real property tax in a particular taxing jurisdiction from farmers
and other owners of eligible land to all other taxpayers.
The amount of this shift, or the tax expenditure, ranges from a very
small percentage of total tax revenues where a small percent of the fair
market value tax base is in eligible farmland, to a peak where about
60% of the tax base is in eligible farmland, and then declines to a small
amount where virtually all the tax base is in farmland. 152
If public services are not to be reduced, these tax expenditures must
be compensated for by raising the tax rate. If for example, assessment
on participating land is reduced by 50% and participating land made up
50% of the tax base (when assessed at market value) then the tax rate
would have to be raised by 33%. Though all taxpayers would face this
150. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THE COSTS OF SPRAWL (U.S. Government Print-
ing Office 1974).
151. Peterson, supra note 122.
152. For a detailed analysis of the tax expenditure aspects of differential assessment
and the derivation of the equation for measuring tax shifts, see UNTAXING OPEN SPACE,
supra note 8, at 80-99.
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increase, it would be offset by the reduction in assessment for owners
of participating land. The full increase of 33% would be faced by non-
participating landowners, typically townspeople, businesses and in-
dustries.
Analyzing actual data on tax shifting indicates that of thirty-nine
Florida counties, over half (twenty-one) experienced a tax rate in-
crease of less than 4% and all but three had an increase of less than
10%.153 A study of 151 rural New Jersey townships revealed that over
half had tax rate increases of under 20%, while another 40% had
increases of 20% to 50%. 154 Analysis of California data showed that of
the forty-six counties under the Williamson Act, thirty-eight or 82%
experienced revenue losses of less than 3% to 9% and only two of
more than 10%.155
The tax rollback or conveyance tax provisions serve to mitigate the
tax shifts discussed above, when farmers start selling participating
land for conversion to ineligible uses.
As the real estate market adjusts to the new tax ground rules estab-
lished by a differential assessment program, values of differentially
assessed land will tend to rise (because carrying costs are reduced),
and value of other land will tend to fall because taxes attributable to it
are somewhat higher. Of course, the rollover and recapture of deferred
taxation and the provisions of restrictive agreements can reduce or
eliminate this effect. All these effects will counteract to some extent
the initial tax shift impact.
In summary, the tax shift in a small rural township could be quite
significant, if land is under development pressure. In a large communi-
ty with a significant non-farm tax base, it will normally be a much
smaller percentage. On a statewide basis, in the four states of those
studied which had sufficient data, tax shifts constituted less than 3.5%
of total tax revenues. While the percentages of shift were relatively
small, the amount of tax shifts was significant. In Washington (with a
relatively new program) it was $2.7 million, in Oregon, $24.9 million, in
New Jersey, $40 million and in California, $60 million. 5 6 As landow-
ners enroll in the more recently enacted programs around the country,
153. Id. at 90-93.
154. J. KOLESAR & J. SCHOLL, SAVING FARMLAND (1975).
155. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 8, at 288-90.
156. Id. at 95-98.
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legislatures will be confronted with the decision as to whether tax
shifts of this magnitude can be justified either on the basis of tax relief
for farmers, which they clearly achieve, or on the basis of the preser-
vation of open land which they fail to secure.
Four states have adopted provisions which seek to lessen the tax
shift in municipalities. Under California's Williamson Act, the state
has made so-called "subvention" payments to participating county
and city governments which, according to informed estimates,
amounted to about one-third of statewide tax expenditures. 57 New
York's law provides for state reimbursement of one-half of the tax
losses resulting if the state creates an agricultural district.158 Michigan
softens the tax expenditure burden at the local level by allowing
eligible landowners to credit any property taxes in excess of 7% of
their income against the state income tax.159 Alaska has legislative
authorization for full state reimbursement of local tax losses.' °
There is a pervasive need for more and better information about the
operations of differential assessment. Most states have simply failed to
establish data recording, collection and dissemination systems ade-
quate to perform the job. And yet, as differential assessment programs
mature, they involve a major re-allocation of tax burden, and those
who are paying higher tax bills have a right to accurate information
about the magnitude of the tax expenditure and the efficacy of the
program for achieving legitimate public objectives.
Preferential assessment programs are the simplest to administer
because assessors need only compute current use value and police
their jurisdictions to see that enrolled land remains in eligible use.
Deferred taxation programs usually require assessors to determine
both current use value and fair market value each year so that the
deferred taxes may be computed. At the time of conversion, back
taxes must be determined and collected. On a per farm basis, restric-
tive agreement programs require most attention because of the work
involved in preparing the contract, and if the program is like Califor-
157. Id. at 286-88. There are many factors that make it difficult to estimate tax losses
or shifts with confidence. Some of the foregoing revenue may be offset by higher taxes
on unrestricted lands whose value has increased because of development pressure
deflected from restricted lands or because of proximity to protected open space. See The
Property Tax and Preservation of Open Space Land in California: A Study of the
Williamson Act, supra note 147, at 89-96.
158. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKms. LAW § 305(l)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
159. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 554.711 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1287(10) (Callaghan Supp.
1976)).
160. ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.035(e) (Michie 1976).
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nia's, in determining the taxes due during the run-out period. This
additional work will be somewhat compensated for since smaller per-
centages of landowners will enroll their land than in the other types of
programs.
Cost can be reduced by state assistance covering such matters as
assessment procedures, data storage and retrieval and calculation of
back taxes. Many of the programs examined charge application fees of
sufficient magnitude to cover costs of processing, so that most, if not
all, of the expenses are passed on to the beneficiaries of the program.
Generally, expenses at the state level are minimal.
Differential assessment has a basic political appeal. Once enacted,
this method is invisible and is not subject to annual budgetary review,
except, of course, in the few states which have some form of subven-
tion.
The recognition that differential assessment alone is ineffective for
preserving open space has led legislators in a growing number of states
to consider stronger devices such as public purchase of development
rights or privately transferable development rights. New Jersey is in
the course of implementing an experimental development rights pur-
chase program,'16 and in 1977, Maryland adopted a comprehensive
program for the preservaiion of agricultural land which included the
acquisition of agricultural easements. 162 Across the country, legisla-
tures are experimenting with a wide variety of techniques for preserv-
ing agricultural land, such as exclusive agricultural zoning, purchase
and leaseback of agricultural land, inverse condemnation, valuation of
farmland for estate and inheritance purposes at farm use value, and
agricultural districting. 63 While not sufficient in and of itself to save
valuable farmland, differential assessment will undoubtedly constitute
an important component of any general effort to preserve agricultural
land.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. If differential assessment is to be a useful land use device,
existing legislation should be amended (and new legislation should be
written) so as to contain the following provisions:
1. All differential assessment statutes should provide for deferred
161. See note 3 supra.
162. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2, §§ 503-515 (Michie Supp. 1977).
163. See R. COUGHLIN, SAVING THE GARDEN: THE PRESERVATION OF FARMLAND AND
ENVIRONMENTALLY VALUABLE LAND (1977).
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taxation in order to achieve greater equity among all taxpayers. The
rollback period should be at least ten years, and preferably, the entire
period during which tax savings were enjoyed. Interest should be
charged on the deferred tax benefits at rates at least as high as those
charged by commercial lending institutions.
2. States which mandate differential assessment by units of local
government should provide at least partial compensation for the tax
expenditures which result. The reason for this is that the benefits in
preserving agriculture and open space which may result from differ-
ential assessment are enjoyed far beyond the boundaries of the local
taxing jurisdiction in which the differentially assessed land is located.
Therefore, the costs should be shared broadly, not borne solely by the
non-eligible taxpayers of the local jurisdiction.
This can be done either by a state subvention, as in California, 16 or
through the use of a state income tax credit as in Michigan.165 In any
case, uniform assessment procedures should be set up and enforced by
the state so that each jurisdiction is treated equally.
3. A statewide data system should be established and made part of
the basic legislation. The information collected should allow officials
to assess the expenditures involved in the differential assessment
programs and to determine more accurately the impact of the program
on rates of sale and conversion. This information would also be useful
for general planning purposes.
B. By itself, differential assessment is an inadequate tool for
achieving the goal of maintaining current use. It is, however, a useful
component of a broader approach which should have the following
characteristics:
1. Eligible land should be designated specifically following studies
of its capability for agriculture, the need for farmland and land in other
open uses, and the projected demand for land for urban development,
vacation houses, strip mining, and other non-agricultural uses. It is
especially important that the agricultural districts designated be large
enough to be functionally and economically viable and located so that
they will be relatively free from intrusion of urban and suburban
activity. The designation of these areas will determine large-scale land
use patterns. Therefore, designation should be made by state, regional,
or possibly county government, rather than by local government.
164. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 16100, 16142 (Deering 1973 & Supp. 1977).
165. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.711 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1287(10) (Callaghan Supp.
1976)).
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2. Strict controls should be placed on the development of desig-
nated land. If these controls exceed the limits of police power regula-
tion, compensation should be paid to the owners, by such techniques
as public purchase of development rights or the transfer of devel-
opment rights. Funds for the public purchase of rights should be raised
by the level of government which designates the eligible land, the
major part of the funding coming from special levies on other land
when it is developed. A capital gains tax covering at least a fifteen-year
period would be one such levy.
The foregoing measures should prove sufficient to keep specified
land out of development, but they will not necessarily be sufficient to
keep it in agricultural use. To do that, additional policies would have to
be enacted, perhaps including special incentives and subsidies. The
detailing of such policies, however, lies-far beyond the scope of this
Article.
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